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A theology which asks the question "What is the meaning 
of revelation ?" is peculiarly a child of modern times. Theolo- 
gians and school children alike knew the answer throughout 
most of Christian history in terms of a simple distinction 
between natural or rational and revealed knowledge, the 
former a function of the unaided human mind, the latter 
direct communication from God Himself. To be sure, theolo- 
gians of the Middle Ages might encourage a questioner to 
approach God from either direction, but from the thirteenth 
century onward, there was often an insistence upon a separa- 
tion of the two ways of knowing. St. Thomas Aquinas and his 
followers all made the distinction. Even the breakup following 
the Middle Ages did not notably disturb its terms even while 
shifting its balance of emphasis. 
To the majority of seventeenth and eighteenth century 
rationalists, supernatural revelation, if indeed there was such, 
was a concession to weaker minds, and concerned truths open 
to an unaided reason whose exercise was sufficiently sustained. 
Spinoza, for example, allotted to reason the whole field of 
truth. He would allow revelation to define dogmas of faith 
but only insofar as they were prerequisites to obedience and 
piety. I t  was reason's task to determine precise doctrine. 
The reformers, on the other hand, peering through an 
Augustinian conception of human depravity, saw little or no 
reliable knowledge of things divine issuing from so damaged an 
instrument as reason. True, Calvin inconsistently granted to 
reason the power to discover "innumerable proofs" for God's 
existence from the world of nature, but Luther contemplated 
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human reason only with contempt. Their spiritual progeny 
hastily reverted to a viewpoint allowing greater room to 
reason, however. Melanchthon's position was virtually that of 
the scholastics. 
The natural or rational theology of the late Middle Ages 
was little heard of outside of Roman Catholicism by the nine- 
teenth century. But during that century this also meant 
that the concern for revelation which St. Thomas conceived 
of as a supplement to reason also virtually disappeared. Kant, 
for example, makes little reference to revelation, and the great 
Schleiermacher almost confines the conception to a single 
postscript. 
Schleiermacher's emphasis on a religious self-consciousness 
seems to preclude the idea of a revelation which could provide 
cognitive knowledge. To him revelation had to do with a 
state of feeling rather than cognition. Not many were willing 
to follow him thus far, but he did in a way express the intellec- 
tual climate of much of the nineteenth century. Lessing, 
Jacobi, and Hegel all held positions consonant with that of 
Schleiermacher. Ritschl saw theological knowledge as resting 
on "value judgments of faith" rather than upon theoretical 
knowledge of God as preliminary to faith. "We know the 
nature of God and Christ only in their value for us." Certainly 
there was no place in his system for revelation conceived as 
doctrine communicated with authority. 
Biblical criticism had made the concept of verbal inspiration 
so untenable to many nineteenth-century scholars that they 
were forced to conclude that only by abandoning the term 
revelation itself could they effectively retreat from so vulne- 
rable a position. This retreat provides the historical ante- 
cedents for much of contemporary thinking on the subject. 
I t  shall be the acknowledged purpose of this article to 
consider in somewhat general terms the essential features 
of the current discussion. An attempt will also be made to 
assay its significance to Christian faith. I t  will not be 
even to resemble in so brief a , tr&ment adequate coverage 
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of the variant viewpoints available to us. But since they are 
in somewhat general agreement in what they deny if not 
in what they affirm, it seems worthwhile to assess their 
agreement and what it implies. 
Traditionally, revelation has meant an unveiling of some- 
thing formerly hidden. Now there is a sense, of course, in 
which all knowledge may be regarded as revealed. The know- 
ing mind observes, selects, and interprets. But it must do so 
from that which is presented to it, and therefore must be 
active as well as passive in the knowing act. I apprehend 
correctly only when my apprehension agrees with that which is 
apprehended. However, some theologians anxious to maintain 
a clear distinction between what they have called divine 
revelation and rational knowledge have spoken as if revelation 
alone is something given to us and as if the knowledge avail- 
able to reason is largely the creation of the knowing mind. 
I t  might seem obvious that no act of perceiving can be 
explained solely from the side of the knowing subject, regard- 
less of what kinds of objects enter into the knowing experience. 
If it is to be knowledge about something and not merely 
imagination or false opinion, something must, a t  least in one 
sense, be presented to the knower. But the question that 
concerns us here is whether this is all we indicate by the term 
revelation; whether revealed knowledge differs only in the 
kind of information made available. 
For many present day thinkers, Biblical revelation seems 
to differ from the more casual knowing process by always 
taking place between persons. In other words, revelation is 
not of an object to a subject but from mind to mind, from 
subject to subject. There is a further distinction to be noted. 
In Biblical revelation, it is revelation of the Divine Mind to 
the human mind, and not merely of one human mind to ano- 
ther. According to this distinction, when we reveal ourselves 
to others, we do so for the most part in terms of knowledge 
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about ourselves rather than knowledge of ourselves. God, on 
the other hand, discloses only Himself rather than a body of 
information concerning certain things about which we might 
otherwise be ignorant. In short, divine revelation has not to 
do with information about God, but the very God Himself. 
Kittel notes that both in the New Testament and in the 
Old, revelation is neither the communication of supernatural 
knowledge nor the stimulation of numinous feeling, though 
both of these may accompany the revelation. "His offering 
is Himself in fellowship." 
I t  should not be necessary to observe that this is far from 
the church's classical understanding of revelation. The Chris- 
tian Church very early began to equate divine revelation 
with a body of information which God communicated to men. 
Its stubborn defense of the position was partially due to its 
apologetic needs during those troubled years, and partially 
because it buttressed threatened ecclesiastical authority 
with a necessary unity of doctrine. 
Revelation thus formulated characterized later Judaism 
and Christianity in both its Roman and Protestant branches 
with minor exceptions until the modern period. The words 
of the Bible were conceived as the i$sissima verba of God, a 
view still more or less prevailing in much of Roman Catholi- 
cism and in certain so-called fundamentalist branches of 
Protestantism. 
Elsewhere in Christendom revelation has come to be 
considered in quite other terms. Let us note some prominent 
examples: Wilhelm Herrmann of Marburg said, "God is the 
content of revelation. All revelation is the self-revelation of 
God." Karl Barth's "Word of God" which may be spoken 
to man as he reads the words of the Bible but is not itself 
the words of the Bible is also typical.2 William Temple once 
Wilhelm Herrrnann, Der Begrig der Ogenbarung (1887) ; reprinted 
in O@abarung und Wunder  (Giessen, 1go8), pp. g ff. 
Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, -UJ, I ,  part 2 (New York 195~) '  
PP. 473 ff. 
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said, "What is offered to man's apprehension in any specific 
revelation is not truth concerning God but the living God 
Himself." (It is interesting that almost all of these men 
claim this to be the conception of the Bible writers themselves.) 
Says John Baillie, 
[When we] consider the Biblical view of revelation, i t  is abundant- 
ly clear that what is here regarded as revealed is a way of deliverance 
from an ultimate human exigency, a way of salvation . . . it is not 
primarily the knowledge of salvation that is spoken of as revealed 
but the salvation itself. . . The Bible does indeed speak of saving 
knowledge, but this is no mere knowledge that, and no mere know- 
ledge about; i t  is knowledge of. I t  is what our epistemologists call 
knowledge by acquaintance as distinct from merely conceptual 
knowledge. God does not give us information by communication. 
He gives us Himself in communion.* 
This God who gives Himself in communion rather than in 
propositions is revealed as Being-in-action, invading the 
field of human experience. The Bible is the story of God's 
acts, the record of what He has done. Emil Brunner says 
that "revelation is not a book or a doctrine; the revelation 
is God Himself in His self-manifestation within history. Reve- 
lation is something that happens . . ." Rudolf Bultmann 
writes, to reveal ". . . does not designate a doctrine which 
enlightens but an action of God, that is, an event. . ." 
Such events may also point to future events and thus fuller 
revelation. 
All this represents a departure from classical thinking on the 
subject. To our older theologians, God's action in history was 
seen as only "among other things" concerning which we are 
informed in the Scriptures. Well-known is the division by 
St. Thomas Aquinas of revelation into information concerning 
William Temple, Nature, Man and God (London, 1953), p. 322. 
John Baillie, The Idea of Revelation (New York, 1956), pp. 46, 47. 
Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason (London, 1947)~ p. 8. 
Rudolf Bultmann, Der Begrig der Ogenbarung im Neuen Testa- 
went (Tiibingen, 1929), p. 22, note 5. 
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God's nature, His works, and the events to be expected at 
the end of earthly history. 
Most of the writers to whom we have referred agree that the 
revelation of God in history is by no means simple. Involved 
are both God's activity and the interpretation of that activity. 
I t  does not necessarily follow that those who experience the 
events find in them God's revelation. The divine self-disclosure 
has as its necessary pre-condition the illumination of the 
receiving mind. Thus the words of Brunner, "The fact of the 
illumination is therefore an integral part of the process of 
revelation . . . Jesus Christ is not 'revelation' if He is not 
recognized by anyone as the Christ." History, according 
to C. H. Dodd, is "not merely occurrences but events which 
are occurrences plus meaning. " He notes further that some 
of these events are such "that the meaning of what happened 
is of greater importance historically speaking than what 
happened." In much contemporary theology it is this 
capacity for seeing meaning in history that constitutes in- 
spiration. 
God's acts in history are accomplished through human 
agencies and thus are not only divine actions but a t  every 
point also the actions of men even though God may be their 
intiator. I t  is in meaningful response to God's action that man 
takes part in the revelatory encounter, and it is only because 
of this meaning-involvement that man is able to see God in 
history. Wheeler Robinson in his Redemfition and Revelatiofl 
says the prophets 
. . . find in the migration of Bedouin tribes from Egypt the 
evidence of the redeeming activity of God. And they find in the 
deportation of the Israelites to Babylon the not-less-clear evidence 
of punitive activity of God vindicating His moral order. The events 
themselves are, of course, capable of other explanations. But  this 
was theirs. And their explanation became a new event of far-reaching 
consequence for the subsequent h i ~ t o r y . ~  
Emil Brunner, op. cit., p. 33. 
' C. H. Dodd, Histovy and the Gospel (New York, 1938)' pp. 104 
Wheeler Robinson, Redemption and Revelatia (London, 1942). 
pp. 182 ff. 
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History thus was not merely history but Heilsgeschichte, and 
the events clothed with meanings provided a living relation 
in history with the God who is beyond history. 
Many of these writers see all of history as in some way the 
medium of revelation. Some (e.g., William Temple) see unusual 
interventions on God's part as providing an exceptional 
revelatory quality. Others (e.g., Paul Tillich) say that "there 
is no reality, thing, or event which cannot become the bearer"1° 
of revelation providing it enters into "revelatory constella- 
tions." Tillich speaks of persons as having the greatest possi- 
bility for revelatory significance. 
Revelation as divine-human interpersonal encounter is 
bound to reject any simple and direct identification of the 
Christian revelation with the contents of the Bible. The 
Bible becomes rather the written witness to such a relation. 
Nor does it necessarily deny that the Holy Spirit was operative 
in the recording of that witness. Baillie suggests, for example, 
that "the same Holy Spirit who enlightened them unto their 
own salvation must have aided their efforts." l1 The question 
would seem to be, Aided them how much and in what fashion ? 
The Roman Church, at least in the past, and the prevailing 
view in traditional Protestantism was that the aid was plenary, 
that is, to the point of inerrancy. The Roman Church could, 
of course, project plenary inspiration from the Bible on into 
the Church, in a manner denied Protestants. 
Is the Bible equally everywhere the witness to divine- 
human interaction, and thus to revelation? I t  is held by 
some that various portions of the Bible must be judged 
according to the measure of their transparency to the living 
God. There may be many things in the Bible possessing little 
revelatory quality although it might seem artificial and un- 
Profitable to list them since the referred-to transparency may 
differ from individual to individual. 
None of the Scriptures will be the vehicle of revelation to 
lo Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago, 1951)) pp. 118 ff. 
l1 John Baillie, o p .  cit., p. III. 
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persons who are unable to hear God speaking through them. 
Such might read the Bible from cover to cover without ever 
encountering God's word. The Bible, indeed, supports this 
contention in such passages as, Spiritual things "are spiritually 
discerned"12 and that the "preaching of the cross is to them 
that perish f~olishness,"~~ "none of the wicked shall under- 
stand; but the wise shall understand,"14 and Jesus' reference 
to those who had eyes and ears, yet could neither see nor 
hear. l5 It must surely always be the duty of the Bible student 
to ask himself concerning any perplexing passage whether 
the defect may not be in himself rather than in the text. 
Granted that the conception of revelation discussed in the 
preceding paragraphs represents an important departure 
from the traditional views of the historical church, it remains 
to be asked whether it can justly claim to be that of the Bible. 
That the view is not wholly inconsonant with the Biblical 
record seems fairly evident. The centrality of God in Christ in 
the Bible is noted by Jesus Himself. Said He, "They are they 
which testify of me." l6 The sermon at  Nazareth and His 
conversation with the two disciples on the road to Emmaus 
all resolutely attest to this truth. 
Revelation is indeed an encounter with the living God Him- 
self. But, we make bold to ask, can this crucial emphasis 
upon the centrality of God in the revelation be maintained 
in the absence of certain propositions about God? IS it 
not possible that a too-radical denial of the propositional 
content of revelation runs the risk of negating the entire 
enterprise ? 
One example of the implications of such a position can be 
l2 I Cor 2 : 14. 
lS I Cor I : 18. 
l4 Dan 12 : 10. 
l6 Mk 8 : 18. 
l6 Jn 5 : 39. 
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found in contemporary ethics. I t  is precisely this viewpoint 
which has given rise to contextual relativism in ethics, an 
ethical stance that leaves the seeker for moral guidance little 
comfort in the face of tragic moral decision save divine for- 
giveness. Paul Lehmann, one of its key exponents, writes, 
"The fact is that propositional revelation and juridical ex- 
positions of a divine will are as obsolescent in Protestant 
theology as thorough-going anthropological relativism is in 
social ethics." 17 Contextualist ethics constitutes a radical 
denial of the possibility of discovering precise, enduring and 
dependable answers to the question of what it is that I as 
a Christian am supposed to do in the world. It escapes the 
ethical nihilism of a thorough-going relativity only by insisting 
on the context of the church as its proper field of operation-a 
context, by the way, notoriously difficult to define. This 
position, underplaying as it does the continuities in the human 
predicament and purposes of God, seemingly fails to provide 
even the minimal moral guidance which every Christian has 
a right to seek from his faith. 
The emphasis we are considering appears to be largely one 
of reaction against the sterile propositionalism of past Roman 
Catholic and Protestant views of revelationviews which 
were more often quests for authority and the buttressing of 
church apologetics than a seeking for the mind of God. As in 
most theologies of reaction, may it not be that its rejection 
of propositional revelation is also an extreme, undercutting 
viability in another direction? May it not be the case that 
while the person-to-person encounter with the living God 
constitutes the heart of the revelatory experience, such an 
encounter depends more than might be obvious upon propo- 
sitions both for its communication and its confirmation? 
1s it ever possible to know God by acquaintance, apart from 
supporting constellations of propositions about Him? More- 
over, pray tell, how does one proceed to introduce Him to 
l7 Paul Lehmann, Ethics in a Christian Context (New York, 1963), 
P. 248; see also n. I. 
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individuals in ignorance without a t  least a minimal medium 
of symbolic or analogic conceptual formulae ? Surely these 
constitute the bulk of what is meant by propositions about 
God. 
Knowledge by acquaintance would seem to presuppose 
at  every step knowing the that and the about even though the 
of finally transcends such knowledge in relative significance. 
The vertical dimension, to use Barth's well-known figure, 
presupposes the horizontal it transects. Would it ever be 
possible to check illusion and delusion without the logical 
tests of coherence and meaning provided only within the 
realm of propositional knowledge? As one young man once 
expressed his wrestling with the concept of God, "I am never 
quite sure whether I am merely shadow-boxing with half- 
forgotten memories of my old man." How does one test truth 
and distinguish it from its competitors apart from information 
belonging to the public domain ? And finally, can an ethical 
response to a revelation devoid of propositional context sur- 
vive as a force in a world of men half uprooted from their 
fathersJ concrete convictions regarding moral excellence ? 
There is no doubt justification for a protest that the de- 
scription of revelation to which the above comments are 
directed is a selective caricature rather than the total view of 
very many responsible modern thinkers. This we freely admit, 
however noting that the function of caricature is to throw 
into bold relief sub-surface tendencies not casually apparent. 
What we intend is to draw attention to what we insist is a 
hazardous tendency in contemporary theology. We take some 
comfort from the evidence that others have also sensed the 
peril. Surely this is the warning note sounded by the new 
quest for the historical Jesus as well as some current wistful 
glances at the Ten Commandments. 
Lionel Thomton once wrote, 
The Biblical writen wove the garments in which theophany is 
clothed apart from which it  cannot be manifested, for without that 
external medium of presentation the revelation would simply 
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disappear from our ken. As surely as in a modern scientific romance 
"the invisible man" was no longer seen when he took off his clothes.18 
May we submit that the invisible word was beheld only by 
becoming clothed in flesh. To this, Biblical faith bears ever 
abundant witness. To dismiss the that and the a b o ~ t  in revela- 
tion is to run the tragic risk of losing the of as well. 
18 Lionel Thornton, Revelation in the Modern World (London, 
I 9.50)~ P. 130- 
